Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. This paper reviews the evidence for an empirically identifiable form of prosocial behavior in humans, which we call 'strong reciprocity,' that may in part explain human sociality. A strong reciprocator is predisposed to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms of extended kinship or reciprocal altruism. We present a simple model, stylized but plausible, of the evolutionary emergence of strong reciprocity.
Introduction
Human groups maintain a high level of sociality despite a low level of relatedness among group members. Three approaches have been offered to explain this phenomenon: reciprocal altruism (Trivers 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981) , cultural group selection (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981, Boyd and Richerson 1985) and genetically-based altruism (Lumsden and Wilson 1981 , Simon 1993 , Wilson and Dugatkin 1997 , Sober and Wilson 1998 . These approaches are complementary and doubtless all contribute to the explanation of human sociality. The analysis of altruism, however, has tended to argue the plausibility of altruism in general, rather than isolating particular human traits that might have emerged from a group selection process. This paper reviews the evidence for one such trait-an empirically identifiable form of prosocial behavior in humans that probably has a significant genetic component. We call this 'strong reciprocity.' A strong reciprocator is predisposed to cooperate with others and punish non-cooperators, even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms of self-interest, extended kinship, or reciprocal altruism. We present a simple yet plausible model of the evolutionary emergence of strong reciprocity.
The Conditions for Sustaining Cooperation
A group of n individuals faces in each time period a 'public goods game' in which each member, by sacrificing an amount c > 0, contributes an amount b > c shared equally by the other members of the group (all costs and benefits are in fitness units).
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If all members cooperate, each receives a net payoff of b − c > 0. However the only Nash equilibrium in this game is universal defection, in which no member contributes, and all members have baseline fitness zero (an arbitrary constant can be added to all fitnesses to account for the growth rate of the overall population). We also assume an individual not in a cooperating group has baseline fitness zero.
While cooperation is not an equilibrium outcome in a single play of this public goods game, it can be sustained under appropriate conditions if the game is repeated. Specifically, suppose a members's contribution is publicly observable, and in any period a player who fails to contribute c is ostracized from the group. Suppose also that group disbands spontaneously at the end of a given period (due to war, pestilence, climate change, and the like) with probability 1−δ. Let π be a member's total expected fitness when contributing, assuming all other members contribute. Then π can be determined by noting that the current period net fitness gain is b − c, plus with probability δ the game is continued and again has value π in the next period. Therefore we have π = b − c + δπ, which gives
A player will contribute, then, as long as (b − c)/(1 − δ) > b, since by not contributing, the member earns b during the current period, but is ostracized at the end of the period. Rearranging terms in this inequality, we get Theorem 1 is of course a completely standard result. With n = 2 is analogous to William Hamilton's (1964) inclusive fitness criterion (where δ represents the degree of relatedness), Robert Triver's (1971) reciprocal altruism mechanism (where δ = 1), and Robert Axelrod's (1984) condition for cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. However, the explicit presence of the discount factor δ in Theorem 1 makes it clear that however great the net benefits of cooperation, if groups disband with high probability, then cooperation among self-interested agents cannot be sustained. 4 Moreover, periodic social crises are not implausible, since population contractions were likely common in the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens (Boone and Kessler 1999) . The very low rate of growth of the human population over the whole prehistoric period, plus the high rate of human population growth in even poor contemporary foraging societies in good times (Keckler 1997) , suggests periodic crises occurred in the past. Moreover, flattened mortality profiles of prehistoric skeletal populations indicate population crashes ranging from 10% to 54% at a mean rate of once per thirty years (Keckler 1997) . Finally, optimal foraging models of hunter-gatherer societies often predict stable limit cycles (Belovsky 1988 ).
In contrast to the self-interested agents assumed in Theorem 1, a strong reciprocator cooperates and punishes noncooperators without considering the value of δ; i.e., even when the probability of future interactions is low. As we shall see, when δ is low, the presence of strong reciprocators can allow the group to secure the benefits of cooperation. However strong reciprocators are altruists, since they bear surveillance and punishment costs not borne by self-interested group members, so they can persist in equilibrium only if certain conditions, which we develop below, are satisfied.
Experimental Evidence for Strong Reciprocity
An extensive body of evidence suggests that a considerable fraction of the population, in many different societies, and under many different social conditions, including complete anonymity, behave like the strong reciprocator. We here review laboratory evidence concerning the public goods game as modeled in the previous section. For additional evidence, including the results of dictator, ultimatum, common pool resource and trust games, see Güth and Tietz (1990) , Roth (1995) , Camerer and Thaler (1995) , and for analytical models, see Gintis (2000) .
The public goods game is a direct test of strong reciprocity, and is designed to illuminate such behaviors as contributing to team and community goals, as well as punishing non-contributors. Public goods experiments were first undertaken by the sociologist G. Marwell, the psychologist R. Dawes, the political scientist J. Orbell, and the economists R. Isaac and J. Walker in the late 1970's and early 1980's (see Ledyard (1995) for a summary of this research and an extensive bibliography). The following is a typical public good game, using a protocol studied by Fehr and Gächter (2000) .
Each round of the game consists of each subject being grouped with three other subjects under conditions of strict anonymity. Each subject is then given twenty 'points,' redeemable at the end of the experimental session for real money. Each subject then places some number of the twenty points in a 'common account,' and the remainder in the subject's 'private account.' The experimenter then tells the subjects how many points were contributed to the common account, and adds to the private account of each subject 40% of the total amount in the common account. It follows that if a subject contributes his whole 20 points to the common account, each player will receive eight points at the end of the round. In effect, by cooperating a player loses 12 points but his teammates gain 24 points. In terms of our model of the previous section, c = 12 and b = 24. The experiment continues for exactly ten rounds, and the subjects are informed of this fact at the start of the experiment.
Clearly full free riding is a dominant strategy in the public goods game. Public goods experiments, however, show that only a fraction of subjects conform to the self-interested model, contributing nothing to the common account. Rather, subjects begin by contributing on average about half of their endowment to the public account. The level of contributions decays over the course of the ten rounds, until in the final rounds most players are behaving in a self-interested manner Thaler 1988, Ledyard 1995) . In a meta-study of twelve public goods experiments Fehr and Schmidt (1999) found that in the early rounds, average and median contribution levels ranged from 40% to 60% of the endowment, but in the final period 73% of all individuals (N = 1042) contributed nothing, and many of the remaining players contributed close to zero. These results are not compatible with the selfinterested actor model, which predicts zero contribution on all rounds, though they might be predicted by a reciprocal altruism model, since the chance to reciprocate declines as end of the experiment approaches. However we shall see that this is not in fact the explanation of moderate but deteriorating levels of cooperation in the public goods game. The explanation of the decay of cooperation offered by subjects when debriefed after the experiment is that cooperative subjects became angry at others who contributed less than themselves, and retaliated against free-riding low contributors in the only way available to them-by lowering their own contributions (Andreoni 1995) . Experimental evidence supports this interpretation. When subjects are allowed to punish noncontributors, they do so at a cost to themselves (Dawes, Orbell and Van de Kragt 1986 , Sato 1987 , Yamagishi 1988a ,1988b .
For instance, in Ostrom, Walker and Gardner (1992) subjects interacted for twenty five periods in a public goods game, and by paying a 'fee,' subjects could impose costs on other subjects by 'fining' them. Since fining costs the individual who uses it, but the benefits of increased compliance accrue to the group as a whole, the only Nash equilibrium in this game that does not depend on incredible threats is for no player to pay the fee, so no player is ever punished for defecting, and all players defect by contributing nothing to the common pool. However the authors found a significant level of punishing behavior.
The design of the Ostrom-Walker-Gardner study allowed individuals to engage in strategic behavior, since costly punishment of defectors could increase cooperation in future periods, yielding a positive net return for the retaliator. Fehr and Gächter (2000) set up an experimental situation in which the possibility of strategic punishment was removed. They used a ten round public goods game with costly punishment, employing three different methods of assigning members to groups. 5 5 Imposing a punishment was quite costly in this experiment. Low levels of punishment (one or two points) was equally costly to punisher and punishee, with higher levels of punishment being relatively more costly to the punisher. Imposing a ten point punishment-the highest level permitted-cost the punisher thirty points. As we argue below, in human societies we expect the costs of punishing to be There were sufficient subjects to run between 10 and 18 groups simultaneously. Under the Personal treatment, the four subjects remained in the same group for all ten periods. Under the Stranger treatment, the subjects were randomly reassigned after each round. Finally, under the Perfect Stranger treatment the subjects were randomly reassigned and assured that they would never meet another subject more than once (in this case, the number of rounds had to be reduced from ten to six to accommodate the size of the subject pool). Subjects earned an average of about $35 for an experimental session.
Fehr and Gächter (2000) performed their experiment for ten rounds with punishment and ten rounds without. Their results are illustrated in Figure 1 . We see that when costly punishment is permitted, cooperation does not deteriorate, and in the Partner game, despite strict anonymity, cooperation increases almost to full cooperation, even on the final round. When punishment is not permitted, however, the same subjects experience the deterioration of cooperation found in previous public goods games.
The contrast between the Partner effect and the two Stranger effects is worth noting. In the latter case punishment prevented the deterioration of cooperation, whereas in the former case punishment led to an increase in participation over time, until near full cooperation was achieved. This result suggest that subjects are motivated by the personal desire to punish free riders (the Stranger treatment), but are even more strongly motivated when they there is an identifiable group, to which they belong, whose cooperative effort is impaired by free riding (the Partner treatment). The prosociality of strong reciprocity is thus more strongly manifested, the more coherent and permanent the group in question.
The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity
A critical weakness of reciprocal altruism is that when a social group is threatened with extinction or dispersal, say through war, pestilence, or famine, cooperation is most needed for survival. But the discount factor δ, which is the probability of group survival for one period, decreases sharply when the group is threatened, since the probability that the group will dissolve increases. Thus precisely when a group is most in need of prosocial behavior, cooperation based on reciprocal altruism will collapse, since the discount factor then falls to a level rendering defection an optimal behavior for self-interested agents.
But strong reciprocity can sustain cooperation in the face of such a threat to the group, and hence might have an evolutionary advantage in situations where groups are frequently threatened. Strong reciprocators, however, are altruists in quite low compared to the costs of being punished. Thus this experiment is strongly biased against finding strong reciprocity. that they increase the fitness of unrelated individuals at a cost to themselves. For, unlike self-interested agents, who cooperate and punish only if this maximizes their within-group fitness payoff, strong reciprocators cooperate even when this involves a fitness penalty. If strong reciprocity is an evolutionary adaptation, it must be a considerable benefit to a group to have strong reciprocators, and the group benefits must outweigh the individuals costs.
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These benefits and costs are conveniently represented in terms of Price's equation (1970), which we express as follows (Frank 1998) . Suppose there are groups i = 1, . . . , m, and let q i be the fraction of the population in group i. Let π i be the mean fitness of group i, so π = i q i π i is the mean fitness of the whole population. Groups grow from one period to the next in proportion to their relative fitness, so if q i is the fraction of the population in group i in the next period, then
Suppose there is a trait with frequency f i in group i, so the frequency of the trait in the whole population is f = i q i f i . If π i and f i are the mean fitness of group i and the frequency of the trait in group i in the next period, respectively, then f = i q i f i , and writing
The second term in (2) is just E[π f ], the expected value of π f , over all groups, weighted by the relative size of the groups. If the trait in question renders individuals bearing it less fit than other group members, this term will be negative, since f i < 0 within each group. To interpret the first term, note that the covariance between the variables π and f is given by
and since i q i (π i − π)f = 0, we can write (2) as
Strong reciprocity can thus persist in equilibrium if and only if cov(π,
where f is the frequency of the strong reciprocity trait and π is group fitness. Suppose now that in each 'good' period the group will persist into the next period with probability δ * , while in a 'bad' period, which occurs with probability p, the group persists with probability δ * < δ * provided members cooperate, but dissolves with probability one if members do not cooperate.
At the beginning of each period, prior to members deciding whether or not to cooperate, the state of the group for that period is revealed. Let π * be the total fitness of a member if all members cooperate, and the state of the group is 'good,' and let π * be the total fitness if members cooperate and the state is 'bad.' Then, the expected fitness before the state is revealed is π = pπ * + (1 − p)π * , and using the same argument as in the derivation of (1), we have the following recursion equations:
which entail
When can cooperation be sustained? Clearly if it is worthwhile for an agent to cooperate in a bad period, it is worthwhile to cooperate in a good period, so we need only check the bad period case. The current benefit of defecting is c, so the condition for cooperation is c < δ * π . There is a Nash equilibrium in which members thus cooperate in the good state but not in the bad when the following inequalities hold:
We assume these inequalities hold. Suppose group i has a fraction f i of strong reciprocators, who cooperate and punish independent of whether the state of the group is good or bad. Suppose each strong reciprocator inflicts a total amount of harm h > 0 on noncooperators, at a personal cost of retaliation c r > 0. Because of (7), in a bad state self-interested agents always defect unless punished by strong reciprocators. If there are n i group members, in a bad state n i (1−f i ) defect, and the total harm inflicted on those caught is n i f i h, so the harm per defector imposed by strong reciprocators is f i h/(1 − f i ).
The gain from defecting in (7) now becomes c − f i h/(1 − f i ). Thus if the fraction f i of strong reciprocators is at least
complete cooperation will hold. Note that f * lies strictly between zero and one. Equation (8), where π is given by (6), leads to the following Theorem 2. The minimum fraction f * of strong reciprocators needed to induce cooperation is lowered by a decrease in the probability p of the bad state, an increase in the probability of survival δ * in the bad state, and/or an increase in the amount of harm h per strong reciprocator inflicted upon noncooperators.
These properties of the model have a straightforward interpretation. A decrease in p raises the fitness value π of being in a cooperative group, thus lowering the fitness gain c − δ * π from defecting in the bad state, which reduces the amount of punishment needed to induce self-interested members to cooperate. An increase in δ * also raises π , and hence lowers c − δ * π , with the same result. The fact that an increase in h allows for cooperation with a smaller fraction of strong reciprocators is completely obvious from (8), but is perhaps the most interesting of these properties since, as a result of the superior tool-making and hunting ability of Homo sapiens, the ability to inflict costly punishment (high h) at a low cost to the punisher (low c r ), probably distinguishes humans from other species that live in groups and recognizing individuals, hence for which reciprocal altruism might occur. While size, strength, and vigor generally determine the outcome of animal disputes, victory often involving great cost even to the winner, in human societies even a small number of attackers can defeat the most formidable single enemy at very low fitness cost to the attackers through the use of coordination, stealth and deadly weapons. Bingham (1999) has stressed the importance of the superior abilities of humans in clubbing and throwing projectiles as compared with other primates, citing Goodall (1964) , Plooij (1978) on the relative advantage of humans, and Darlington (1975) , Fifer (1987) , and Isaac (1987) on the importance of these traits in human evolution. Calvin (1983) argues that humans are unique in possessing the same neural machinery for rapid manual-brachial movements that allow for precision stone-throwing. Theorem 2 suggests one reason why these factors favor the evolution of strong reciprocity.
If f i < f * there will be no cooperation in a bad period (we continue to assume the parameters of the model are such that there is always cooperation in the good period). In this situation the group disbands. Using the same argument as that leading to (1), we see that the fitness π s of members of such noncooperative groups satisfies the recursion equation
Our assumption that there is always cooperation in the good state requires that δ * π s > b, which becomes
Note that the relative fitness benefit from being in a cooperative group is
For example, suppose = 0.95, so the expected duration of a group exposed only to 'good' states is 20 years, suppose p = 0.10, so a 'bad' period occurs in one year out of ten, and suppose δ * = 0.25, so a cooperating group survives with 25% probability in a 'bad' period. Then, π/π = 0.255; i.e., the cooperating group enjoys a 25.5% fitness advantage over the noncooperating group. We suppose that the fraction of strong reciprocators in a group is common knowledge, and strong reciprocators punish defectors only in groups where f i ≥ f * , and in doing so they each incur the fixed fitness cost of retaliation c r . 7 We shall interpret c r as a surveillance cost, and since punishment is unnecessary except in 'bad' periods, strong reciprocators will incur this cost only with probability p, so the expected fitness cost of being a strong reciprocator is pc r .
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We will use Price's equation to chart the dynamics of strong reciprocity, which in this case says the change f in the fraction of strong reciprocators in the population is given by
where π is the mean fitness of the population. Let q f be the fraction of the population in cooperative groups, so
The fitness of each member of a group with f i ≥ f * (resp. f i < f * ) is π (resp. π s ), so the average fitness is π = q f π + (1 − q f )π s . We then have
Algebraic manipulation gives
This common knowledge assumption is strong, but it could be dropped by assuming that the single-stage public good game is played several times in each time period. The level of punishment in the first stage would then correctly signal the frequency of strong reciprocity in the group, so that the common knowledge assumption would hold for the remaining stages. This alternative has the added benefit of being a more plausible representation of human cooperation, and it provided a natural interpretation of c r as the cost of punishing in the first stage. On the other hand, in this case stronger assumptions would be needed to conclude that a small fraction of strong reciprocators could invade a population of self-interested types, since strong reciprocators are now less fit that self-interested types in uncooperative groups. We shall forego this more sophisticated model as it would unnecessarily complicate our exposition.
8 An alternative, perhaps more plausible, pair of assumptions is that c r is expended only when noncooperation is actually detected, and either the public goods game is multi-stage, as in the previous footnote, or there is some source of stochasticity (for instance imperfect signaling or variable agent behavior) that leads to a positive level of punishment even in cooperative groups. The treatment of c r as a surveillance cost is simpler and leads to the identical result that strong reciprocators incur positive costs even in a cooperative equilibrium. so if we let f c = f i ≥f * q i f i /q f , which is the mean fraction of strong reciprocators in cooperative groups, then (13) becomes
To evaluate the covariance term, we define f s = f i <f * q i f i /(1 − q f ), which is the mean frequency of strong reciprocators in noncooperative groups. Then we have
The condition for the increase in strong reciprocity is that the sum of (14) and (15) be positive, which for q f > 0 reduces to
Note that 0 < q f < 1 implies 0 ≤ f s < f c , so we have the following Theorem 3. Suppose the discount factor is δ * in a good period and δ * (< δ * ) in a bad period, and bad periods occur with probability p > 0. Suppose (7) Let f = f s (1 − q f ) + f c q f , which is the frequency of strong reciprocity in the whole population. To close the model and thus determine the equilibrium value of f , we must develop a plausible mechanism for the assignment of individuals to groups, thereby determining f c and f s as functions of f . We shall adopt the conservative assumption that new groups form by the assignment of self-interested individuals and strong reciprocators in proportion to their frequency in the population, so that there is no assortative interaction in the formation of new groups.
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For simplicity, we assume a fixed size founder process, in which newly formed groups are of a fixed size k, and the number of such groups is effectively infinite, so that the frequency of strong reciprocators in a group is given by the binomial distribution; i.e., we assume sampling with replacement in the assignment of individuals to groups.
10 The probability p k that a newly formed group satisfies f ≥ f * is then given by
the frequency of strong reciprocators in such groups is given by
and the frequency of strong reciprocators in groups with f < f * is given by
where q f is given by (12). It follows that (16) cannot be satisfied when f = 1, since in this case q f = 1. On the other hand, f ≥ q f f c ≥ q f f * , so when f is small, so is q f . Then (19) shows that when f is small, so is f s . But f c ≥ f * , so both the second and third terms in (16) approach unity for small f . This proves Theorems 2 and 4 suggest the central importance of the amount of harm h an agent can inflict on noncooperators and the cost c r the agent incurs in so doing. As long as there is a positive fraction of strong reciprocators in the population, (8) shows that sufficiently large h implies q f > 0, where Theorem 2 applies. Theorem 2 then asserts that for sufficiently low cost of retaliation c r , strong reciprocators can invade a population of self-interested agents.
11 Under no condition, however, can strong 10 For a more general analysis of this case, see Cohen and Eshel (1976) . Note that the assumption of sampling with replacement assumes that population size is effectively infinite, so there are an infinite number of strong reciprocators as long as f > 0.
11 Our model thus strongly supports Bingham's (1999) stress on physical factors in explaining cooperation among humans. Bingham makes the stronger claim that human cooperation is based on 'coalitional enforcement' by self-interested agents. This claim is doubtful because coalitional enforcement is a form of reciprocal altruism, which we have shown fails when there is a high probability of group dissolution. Moreover, as we have seen, human revenge and retaliation does not follow the logic of self-interested is behavior. reciprocators drive self-interested agents to extinction, since (16) is necessarily violated when q f is near unity.
Simulating this model (I used Mathematica 3.0) allows us to assess the plausibility of the parameters involved and the nature of the equilibrium fraction f * of strong reciprocators in the population. In equilibrium, (16) must hold as an equality, since the fraction of strong reciprocators in newly formed groups must be equal to that of the population as a whole.
Equations (17) and (18) allow us to estimate the left hand side of (16). The first term on the left hand side is a number greater than unity that, for plausible values of the parameters, lies between 1.0 and 4.0. For instance if δ * = 0.95, δ * ≤ 0.25, and p ≥ 0.10, this factor has a minimum of 1.00 and a maximum of 2.47. The lower curve in Figure 2 shows the equilibrium fraction f * of strong reciprocators for values of c r from 0.05 to 1, when δ * = 0.95, δ * = 0.10, p = 0.10, there are forty members per group, and f * = 3/8 must be strong reciprocators to induce cooperation in the bad state. The upper curve shows the same relationship when there are eight members per group. The latter curve would be relevant if groups are composed of a small number of 'families,' and the strong reciprocity characteristic is highly heritable within families. It is clear from Figure 2 that the incidence of strong reciprocity can be much higher, especially when the cost of retaliation c r is high, when family assortative interaction occurs. 
Conclusion
Reciprocal altruism leads to a high level of cooperation in human societies, and many behavioral scientists believe that reciprocal altruism is sufficient to explain human sociality. Economists are particularly favorable to this belief, since reciprocal altruism is a behavior supported by the so-called rational actor model, which much of economic analysis is presumes.
However laboratory experiments, conducted in many different social settings by different research groups, consistently show that people tend to behave prosocially and punish antisocial behavior, at a cost to themselves, even when the probability of future interactions is extremely low, or zero. We call this strong reciprocity, in contrast with the weak reciprocity associated with reciprocal altruism, because the former behavior is robust in the face of changes in the probability of future interaction.
I have stressed the laboratory experiments in this paper because the controlled environment of the laboratory is conducive to isolating the strong reciprocity motive from other bases for cooperation and punishment. It would be remiss, however, not to mention the prevalence of strong reciprocity in the everyday operation of human society. Two categories of behavior immediately come to mind. First, in many circumstances people retaliate against others, at considerable personal cost, when the possibility of gains through future interaction is remote or zero. Victims of crime, for instance, spend time and energy ensuring that the perpetrators are apprehended and receive harsh sentences, and jilted or betrayed lovers retaliate a great personal cost-often reducing their biological fitness to zero.
A second manifestation of strong reciprocity is evident in the propensity of humans to engage in episodic collective action towards transforming social norms and political regimes. Movements for civil rights, civil liberties, and political democracy in authoritarian states are responsible for creating modern liberal democracies, yet participation in such movements cannot usually be explained in terms of self-interest or reciprocal altruism (Bowles and Gintis 1986) . Nonparticipators in collective action, such as 'scab workers' during a trade union strike, or 'traitors' in a civil war, are spontaneously ostracized and punished, while guerrillas and underground freedom fighters are widely supported, often at great cost to the supporters. Without strong reciprocity, then, human society would likely be quite differently organized than it is, and we likely would be considerably less successful as a species.
Strong reciprocity is a form of altruism, in that it benefits group members at a cost to the strong reciprocators themselves. This papers shows that there is a plausible evolutionary model supporting the emergence of strong reciprocity. This model based on the notion that societies periodically experience extinction-threatening events, and reciprocal altruism will fail to motivate self-interested individuals in such periods, thus exacerbating the threat and increasing the likelihood of group extinction. If the fraction of strong reciprocators is sufficiently high, even selfinterested agents can be induced to cooperate in such situations, thus lowering the probability of group extinction.
